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Service guarantees and consequential loss
under the Australian Consumer Law: The
illusion of uniformity
Joachim Dietrich*
The aim of the new Australian Consumer Law (ACL) is to ’create a single
national consumer law’ establishing a uniform set of rules across all
jurisdictions in relation to consumer protection. There are, however,
exceptions to this uniformity. Although the ACL is a national law, it comes into
effect by the activation of separate jurisdiction of the Commonwealth and
states and territories. The focus of this article is on one specific aspect of the
ACL, namely, the consumer guarantees relating to the supply of services.
Importantly, the ACL’s uniformity is seriously undermined where there is a
failure to comply with the guarantee that services are supplied with due care
and skill, where such failure results in personal injury or property damage.
Here, state and territory laws that determine liability for careless conduct and
that establish relevant defences under the Civil Liability Acts continue to
apply. Given that there are considerable differences between the
jurisdictions, particularly in relation to the available defences, a uniform
national approach therefore does not operate in this context.
Introduction
The new Australian Consumer Law (ACL) came into effect on 1 January
2011. Its stated aim was to ’create a single national consumer law’.1 The ACL
is the response to the perceived shortcomings of the previous, ’relatively
fragmented landscape’ of Commonwealth and state and territory consumer
protection laws.2 Australia now has a uniform set of roles across all
jurisdictions in relation to consumer protection and a uniform articulation of
acceptable conduct in the commercial sphere, and one would expect that this
will be widely welcomed.3 There are, however, exceptions to this uniformity,
as this article demonstrates. Although the ACL is a national law, it comes into
effect by the activation of separate jurisdiction of the Commonwealth and
states and territories. The laws are a complex exercise of co-operative
federalism, with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA)
inserting the ACL as Sch 2 of the CCA. Section 131 and Pt XI of the CCA
applies the ACL as a law of the Commonwealth in relation to corporations.
Part XIAA of the CCA provides for the application of the ACL as a law of the
* Faculty of Law, Bond University. My thanks go to Rick Bigwood for his meticulous
editorial comments. Any remaining mistakes are, of course, my own.
1 Explanatory Memorandum to Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill
No 2 2010, p 3.
2 A Bruce, Consumer Protection Law in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Australia, 2011,
p 1. The reforms implement the recommendations of the Productivity Commission in its
Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Report No 45, Canberra, 2008.
3 See, however, the mixed reception in J Paterson, ’The New Consumer Guarantee Law and
the Reasons for Replacing the Regime of Statutory Implied Terms in Consumer
Transactions’ (2011) 35 MULR 252 at 253~4.
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states and territories (’states’ as shorthand). All states have applied the ACL
under their relevant Fair Trading Acts (FTAs).4 It will take some time for the
full implications of these changes to be understood.
The focus of this article is on one specific aspect of the ACL, namely, the
consumer guarantees that apply to the supply of goods and services in trade
and commerce and, more specifically, the guarantees relating to the supply of
services. These statutory guarantees have replaced the previous Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) which implied terms into consumer contracts.5
The ACL imposes statutory guarantees in relation to services supplied to a
consumer in trade or commerce and mandates certain quality standards in
relation to those services. A failure to fulfil those statutory obligations may be
a source of potential liability of the supplier to the consumer. To generalise
somewhat, a person is a consumer in relation to a supply of services if the
amount paid or payable for the services does not exceed $40,000 or, if it
exceeds that amount, the services ’were of a kind ordinarily acquired for
personal, domestic or household use or consumption’ (s 3(3) of the ACL).
Commonwealth jurisdiction applies where a consumer enters into a contract
with a ’ corporation’, as defined in s 4, or whose conduct otherwise falls
within the more extended operation of the CCA under s 6, which defines
corporation to extend to natural persons in certain contexts. That extended
jurisdiction applies in circumstances including where a person provides goods
or services in the territories, or in interstate trade or commerce.6 Hence, if a
’corporation’ (in its extended sense) supplies services in trade and commerce
to a consumer (or otherwise engages in conduct caught by the ACL), it is
bound by the ACL as a law of the Commonwealth via s 131 and Pt XI o~" the
CCA. In relation to natural persons, the applicable law is that of the relevant
state jurisdiction in which the services were supplied.7 If the ACL were truly
uniform, it would not matter which jurisdiction, Commonwealth or state,
applied or, in the latter case, which state law applied. This is especially given
the cross-vesting of court jurisdiction between Federal and state courts (Div 8
4 Fair Trading (Australian Consumer Law) Act 1992 (ACT) Pt 2, Div 2.2, inserted by the Fair
Trading (Austraiian Consumer Law) Amendment Act 2010 (ACT); Fair Trading Act 1987
(NSW) Pt 3, Div 2, inserted by the Fair Trading Amendment (Australian Consumer Law)
Act 2010 (NSW); Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act (NT) s 26, inserted by the
Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Amendment (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2010
(NT); Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) Pt 3, Division 2, inserted by the Fair Trading (Australian
Consumer Law) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld); Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) Pt 3, Div 1,
inserted by the Statutes Amendment and Repeal (Australian Consumer Law) Act 2010 (SA);
Australian Consumer Law (Tasmania) Act 2010 (Tas) Pt 2, Div 2; Fair Trading Act 1999
(Vic) Pt 2, Div 2, inserted by the Fair Trading Amendment (Australian Consumer Law)
Act 2010 (Vic); Fair Trading Act 2010 (WA) Pt 3, Div 2.
5 For a discussion of the impact of the change from implied terms of contract under the TPA,
to statutory guarantees under the ACL, see Paterson, above n 3.
6 See para 6(2)(c). For convenience, I will use the label ’corporation’ to include this extended
jurisdiction.
7 Indeed, corporations are also subject to state jurisdiction as well as Commonwealth
jurisdiction. This is of little consequence, except where there are differences between state
and Commonwealth laws, in which case issues of inconsistency then arise. See below ’The
Ramifications of s 275’. The state and territory laws operate ’concurrently’ with the CCA,
so far as they are ’capable’ of so operating: s 140H of the CCA. If they are incapable of
operating concurrently, then Conmaonwealth law will prevail by virtue of s 109 of the
Constitution.
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of Pt XI), so that jurisdictional differences will generally not be of significance
under the ACL. However, jurisdiction does matter to the extent to which the
ACL is not uniform. Importantly, the ACL’s uniformity is seriously
undermined in one context, namely, a failure to comply with the guarantee that
services are supplied with due care and skill, where such failure results in
personal injury or property damage.
ACL service guarantees: Due care and skill
One of the advantages of the ACL is that it requires all service providers,
whether corporate or otherwise, in all states and territories, to supply services
to consumers in trade or commerce in accordance with the statutory
guarantees. Under the previous TPA, the implied term that services be
performed with due care and skill was not contained in all states’ FTAs;
specifically, in Queensland and Tasmania, a defendant who was not caught by
Commonwealth jurisdiction was previously not subject to any ’due care’
implied term.s
Section 60 of the ACL provides: ’ff a person supplies, in trade or commerce,
services to a consumer, there is a guarantee that the services will be rendered
with due care and skill.’ Importantly, since s 60 creates a statutory guarantee,
plaintiffs can seek damages for failure to comply with the guarantee under
s 267 of the ACL, which specifically deals with services. Section 267(1)
states:
Action against suppliers of services
(1) A consumer may take action under this section if:
(a) a person (the supplier ) supplies, in trade or commerce, services to the
consumer; and
(b) a guarantee that applies to the supply under Subdiv B of Division 1 of
Part 3-2 is not complied with; and
(c) unless the guarantee is the guarantee under section 60 -- the failure to
comply with the guarantee did not occur only because of:
(I) an act, default or omission of, or a representation made by, any
person other than the supplier, or an agent or employee of the
supplier; or
(H) a cause independent of human control that occurred after the
services were supplied.
Subsections (2) and (3) of s 267 are not the focus of this article: they deal with
failures to comply with the guarantees that can be remedied (subs (2)); or with
failures that cannot be remedied, or are major failures (subs (3), defined
s 268), justifying the termination of contracts. Of particular relevance for the
purpose of this article is where the careless supply of services leads to
personal injury or property damage. Subsection (4) is applicable in that
context:
(4) The consumer may, by action against the supplier, recover damages for any
loss or damage suffered by the consumer because of the failure to comply
8 In those two states, where a person was injured by a non-corporate supplier, such suppliers
may still have been subject to contract law implied terms of due care and skill, but a contract
could exclude such implied terms or exclude or limit liability for breach of such terms.
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with the guarantee if it was reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would
suffer such loss or damage as a result of such a failure.
(5) To avoid doubt, subsection (4) applies in addition to subsections (2) and (3).
ff the failure to provide services with due care and skill leads to foreseeable
personal injury or property damage, then compensation for such personal
injury is available under s 267 as reasonably foreseeable ’loss or damage’.
Section 13 of the ACL includes injury within the definition of ’loss or
damage’. Foreseeable injury or damage could well occur in many contexts, for
example, the supply of recreational services or repair work of potentially
dangerous equipment. Therefore, if a mechanic carelessly performs car repair
services to a consumer, causing brake failure, then assuming that personal
injury is a foreseeable consequence of such a breach, damages for personal
injury would be recoverable under s 267 of the ACL.9 Consequential losses
could also include pure economic loss.l° Questions have been raised about the
precise meaning of, and test for, reasonable foreseeability in this context and
about the appropriate measure of damages,11 but such questions are not likely
to impact on the basic proposition here at issue.
Nevertheless, an important question arises in relation to a claim for breach
of s 60 and damages under s 267. Despite the promise of greater uniformity
as a result of the ACL, ongoing differences between the Civil Liability Acts
(CLAs) of the states and territories,12 and the interaction of those Acts with the
ACL, will continue to pose considerable legal challenges in the field of
carelessly provided services. Do the CLAs apply in relation to establishing the
legal requirements for liability under s 60 and the applicable defences, as well
as the applicable principles for calculating damages (including the various
limits contained in the CLAs)?
The answer appears to be ’yes’. Since proof of a breach of s 60 requires the
9 The term ’consequential loss’ is not used, however, in the ACL; s 267 refers to ’reasonably
foreseeable’ losses. Under the TPA see, eg, Crawford v Mayne Nickless Ltd (t/as MSS Alarm
Service) (1992) 59 SASR 490, in which the consumer sued for breach of s 74(2), requiring
services to be fit for the particular purposes made known to the supplier by the consumer (cf
s 61 of the ACL, discussed below). The services were not suitable: the supply of a burglar
alarm system that could easily be disengaged led to recoverable property losses, specifically
the large amount of stock stolen by thieves.
10 Eg, under the TPA, Seeley International Pty Ltd v Newtronics Pty Ltd (2002) Aust Torts
Reports 81-648; Aust Contract R 90-142; [2001] FCA 1862; BC200108270, the careless
design of electronic components resulted in fires in houses of the applicant’s customers:
consequential losses of profit and to business reputation were recoverable.
1 ! See J W Carter, Contract and the Australian Consumer Law -- A Guide, LexisNexis
Butterworths, Australia, 2011, at [2.23]. In particular, one issue is how such a broadly stated
test, which allows for the recovery of ’all loss or damage caused by the failure to comply
with a consumer guarantee, other than loss which could not have been foreseen’ (p 37), can
apply to strict duties such as contained in s 61 (see below). Such a broad statement of
liability is analogous to the extent of liability in the tort of negligence, and hence may be
appropriate for breach of a guarantee of due care, but may be too broad where strict
compliance is required. See also Paterson, above n 3, at 276-9.
12 The titles of the various Acts, like their content, are not uniform. The relevant acts in each
jurisdiction are as follows: Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Civil Liability Act 2002
(NSW); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003
(Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vie);
and Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA). For convenience, each of these Acts will be referred to
in shorthand form as the CLA (NSW), CLA (Qld) etc.
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consumer plaintiff to show that the defendant service supplier acted without
due care and skill, the CLAs on their face apply to such statutory claims. All
the Acts set out general principles applying to claims arising from a failure to
take reasonable care, irrespective of whether such claims are brought in tort,
contract or under statute.13 Therefore, subject to certain general exclusions to
the operation of each Act,a4 claims under statute will be governed by the
relevant state CLA. I am assuming for the purposes of analysis that a failure
to act with ’due care and skill’ equates to a breach of duty of care in
negligence. That assumption is all the more justified, since the CLAs appear
to operate on that basis,as Importantly, s 275 of the ACL seemingly allows the
continued operation of state laws that apply to the careless supply of services
under a contract.
Section 275 of the ACL
Background
Section 275 states:
Limitation of liability etc
If:
(a) there is a failure to comply with a guarantee that applies to a supply of
services under Subdivision B of Division l of Part 3-2; and
(b) the law of a State or a Territory is the proper law of the contract;
that law applies to limit or preclude liability for the failure, and recovery of that
liability (if any), in the same way as it applies to limit or preclude liability, and
recovery of any liability, for a breach of a term of the contract for the supply of the
services.
This is a complex section, and all of the difficulties of the terminology used
in it cannot be explored here. To simplify, the effect of the section appears to
be to make the CLAs applicable to the statutory claim under the ACL. In other
words, s 275 engages any law, of the state that is the relevant ’proper law of
the contract’, that ’applies to limit or preclude liability’ under a claim on the
contract. As will be seen from the discussion below, the likely effect of s 275
13 CLA (ACT): see Ch 4, s 41 (’negligence claims’). CLA (NSW): see s 5A (Part applies to
claims for harm resulting from negligence, regardless of the precise cause of action pleaded
to sustain such a claim). CLA (Qld): see Ch 2, Pt 1 (most sections apply to ’breach of duty
of care’, defined to include claims in contract or under statute, though Div 4 on dangerous
recreational activities applies only to ’negligence’ suggesting that breaches of contractual
duties of care are not within the scope of the Division: see R J Douglas, G R Mullins and
S R Grant, The Annotated Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), 2nd ed, LexisNexis, Sydney, 2008,
p 167, at [19.5]). CLA (SA): see Pt 6 (which is limited to claims in negligence, defined as
a ’failure to exercise reasonable care and skill, and includes a breach of a tortious,
contractual or statutory duty of care’). CLA (Tas): see s 10 (claims for breach of duty of
care); CLA (Vic): see s 44 (negligence claims ’regardless of whether brought in tort, in
contract, under statute or otherwise’); CLA (WA): Pt 1A purports to apply to all claims for
damages for harm caused by the fault of another (s 5A(1)). See J Dietrich, ’Duty of Care’
(2005) 13 TLJ 17 at 21, for some of the difficulties in relation to the WA provisions.
14 Those exclusions are not relevant for current purposes.
15 Eg, the definition in the CLA (Qld), Schedule: ’dnty of care means a duty to take reasonable
care or to exercise reasonable skill (or both duties)’ appears to cover differently worded
formulae.
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of the ACL is that the various CLAs that directly limit or preclude liability for
careless conduct, including breaches of the statutory guarantee of due care and
skill, will be effective and applicable.
Some background is needed in relation to this section to understand its
purpose and effect. The wording of s 275 is almost identical to that of the
previous s 74(2A) of the TPA, other than seemingly minor changes to the
wording to reflect the change from implied terms to statutory guarantees.16
Section 74(2A) was introduced in 2004 for the express purpose of permitting
the operation of state provisions that limit liability for breach of the implied
term of due care in contract. The Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to
the Treasury Legislation Amendment (Professional Standards) Act 2004,
which included s 74(2A) (and its equivalent in the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission Act (Cth)), stated:
1.3 Other provisions which are similarly capable of being used as an alternative
to negligence in a wide range of circumstances are those in the Trade
Practices Act and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Act 2001 which imply into contracts an obligation to supply services with
’due care and skill’, a concept which has remarkable similarities to the duty
of care required by the law of negligence.
1.4 While contract law is ordinarily dealt with by the State and Territories, the
Commonwealth has been provided with legal advice that the effect of the
High Court’s decision in Wallis v Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty
Ltd is that actions in contract based on a breach of the condition that services
be provided with ’due care and skill’ would not be subject to any limitations
which might be applied by a State and Territory to contractual remedies.17
Certainly, the assumption of the legislators is that s 275 will be to like effect,
although interestingly and perplexingly, the focus of the rationale for this
section is much more narrowly stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the
ACL:
Limitation of liability for recreational services
7.136 The States and Territories currently have laws that allow providers of
recreational services to exclude or limit their liabilities in respect of implied
conditions and warranties in consumer contracts. It is expected that the States
and Territories that currently have such laws in place will choose to have
similar laws that exclude liability in respect of consumer guarantees.
16 Section 74(2A) of the TPA stated:
if:
(a) there is a breach of an implied warranty that exists because of this section in a contract
made after the commencement of this subsection; and
(b) the law of a State or Territory is the proper law of the contract;
the law of the State or Territory applies to limit or preclude liability for the breach, and recovery
of that liability (if any), in the same way as it applies to limit or preclude liability, and recovery
of a liability, for breach of another term of the contract.
17 See more fully the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum to the Treasury Legislation
Amendment (Professional Standards) Act 2004 at [1.1]-[1.5]. To similar effect is the
Consideration in Detail Speech, cited in Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young (2010) 78
NSWLR 641; 268 ALR 570; [2010] NSWCA 137; BC201003933 at [44] per Spigelman CJ,
and see the discussion in more detail of the background to the amendments, at [37]-[46].
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7.137 The ACL provides for such laws to have effect to limit the guarantees
provided for in Chapter 3, Part 3-2, Division 1, Subdivision B of the ACL.
[Schedule 1, item 1: Ch 5, Pt 5 4, Div 3, s 275].18
But is s 275 (and was its predecessor s 74(2A)) successful in allowing the
various state laws to operate in this context?
This brings us to Insight Vacations Pry Ltd v Young,~9 in which the plaintiff
was injured while on a bus tour during an overseas holiday. The injury was
caused by the driver’s negligence. It was held that the driver’s conduct
amounted to a breach of the defendant’s contract, specifically of the implied
term of ’due care’ under s 74 of the TPA. The defendant relied on a clause in
the contract that sought to exclude liability for breach of s 74, and relied on
NSW law that allowed such exclusion clauses?°
The High Court concluded in a unanimous joint judgment of French CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ that s 74(2A) operated to pick up and
apply ’as surrogate federal law’21 only a state law that of itself applies to limit
or preclude liability?~ In other words, s 74(2A) allowed state laws to directly
limit fights of consumers via the CLAs, such as the sections in some states that
deal with dangerous recreational activities. The High Court also held,
however, that s 74(2A) did not allow inconsistent state laws that do not
directly limit liability but merely allow for the exclusion of liability by the
parties to a contract themselves, by means of that contract.23
Assuming that s 275 of the ACL has a similar effect as s 74(2A) of the TPA,
then in the absence of s 275, any restrictions on liability contained in state
CLAs that are not replicated in the ACL or the CCA would be invalid insofar
as they apply to corporations and are inconsistent with the ACL or CCA. This
follows from the previous case law on inconsistency, such as Wallis v
Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd,~4 as well as Insight.
18 See Explanatory Memorandum to Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law)
Bill (No 2) 2010 at [7.136]-[7.139], pp 208-9.
19 (2011) 243 CLR 149; 276 ALR 497; [2011] HCA 16; BC201102833.
20 See s 5N of the CLA (NSW). For criticism of the NSW provision, see J Carter and E Peden,
’A contract law perspective of the Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Bill
2002 (NSW) (2002) 54 Plaintiff 19.
21 (2011) 243 CLR 149; 276 ALR 497; [2011] HCA 16; BC201102833 at [12].
22 Ibid, at [12], [35]-[36].
23 Section 74(2A) of the TPA did not pick up and apply a law such as s 5N:
which in its terms does not limit or preclude liability for breach of contract. In terms, 5N
does no more than permit the parties to certain contracts to exclude, restrict or modify
certain liabilities... [ibid at [26], footnotes omitted].
5N CLA (NSW) allows for exclusion of liability in relation to ’recreational services’
supplied ’in connection with or incidental to the pursuit of any recreational activity’
(subs (4)). It was accepted by the High Court that the bus tour came within such definition
[(2011) 243 CLR 149; 276 ALR 497; [2011] HCA 16; BC201102833 at [19]]. Under the
TPA, however, ’bus tours’ fell outside the narrower definition of recreation services
contained in s 68B (and now in s 139A CCA). Hence, s 68B did not operate to allow
exclusion of liability. Accordingly, the exclusion clause would be void, unless s 74(2A)
’picked up’ s 5N and applied it as Federal law, thus allowing the NSW provisions to operate
[(2011) 243 CLR 149; 276 ALR 497; [2011] HCA 16; BC201102833 at [7]], which it did
not.
24 (1994) 179 CLR 388; 120 ALR 440; 68 ALJR 395; BC9404868.
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The High Court in Wallis25 took a broad approach to the question of
inconsistency between the previous TPA and state legislation, such that any
limitation of liability in state legislation would be inconsistent with the full
(and under s 68, non-excludable) contractual liability for breach created by
s 74. In that case, Queensland legislation limited the liability of a carrier of
goods to a certain monetary sum in specific circumstances. When goods were
damaged in transit, the plaintiff claimed more than that sum, relying on a
breach of s 74 (and the non-excludability of such implied term by s 68). The
High Court held that the provisions of the Queensland legislation were
inconsistent with s 74 and s 68. Section 74 carried with it a full contractual
liability for breach that the Queensland legislation sought to limit.26
The ramifications of s 275
If the High Court’s reasoning in relation to s 74(2A) of the TPA applies
equally to s 275 of the ACL, and there do not appear to be any reasons why
it should not, then important consequences follow for the overall scheme of
the ACL and the uniformity of that scheme. Given that the CLAs differ among
the various state jurisdictions, there is accordingly no uniformity in
determining precisely the circumstance in which a remedy is available for
personal injury or property damage that results from a breach of the s 60
guarantee. The lack of uniformity (and hence diversity of approach) is
endorsed by s 275 of the ACL.
As a result of s 275, it is therefore likely that individual state provisions that
restrict liability continue to operate in each jurisdiction. These would apply
equally to corporate suppliers. Restrictions on liability include even general
defences, such as contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk,
which are probably only effective as a result of s 275. If s 275 did not apply
state laws, then a contributorily negligent consumer, for example, injured by
the supplier’s careless supply of services, could ignore a claim in tort and
proceed under s 267, arguing that any state law restrictions are inconsistent
with the rights created under the ACL (and s 131 of the CCA), at least so far
as corporate supplier of services are concerned.27 These general defences,
though broadly similar in the different CLAs, are not dealt with in an entirely
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, at CLR 396 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ (Deane, Dawson JJ and McHugh JJ
concurring). Since s 68 stated that a term of a contract that limited liability was void and
said nothing about state legislation having such effect, it could have been argued that s 74
implied one contractual duty, whereas the Queensland legislation merely limited the
damages payable as a result of any breach of contract. Nonetheless, such arguments were not
accepted by the High Court.
27 The CCA does not have any applicable contributory negligence defence. It does have
contributory negligence defence provisions that apply to claims for damages under s 236 for
contraventions of Chs 2 and 3 of the ACL, including, s 18, (s 137B of the CCA) and in
relation to defective goods claims against a manufacturer under ss 138 and 139 of the ACL
(s 137A of the CCA). Interestingly, these are contained in the CCA rather than the ACL, but
are still stated to apply to persons and not just corporations.
Under the previous TPA claims for breach of the implied term of due care and skill were
not, it would appear, subject to contributory negligence defence, though I am not aware of
any authoritative decision on point. See, eg, Renehan v Leeuwin Ocean Adventure
Foundation Ltd (2006) 17 NTLR 83; 151 NTR 1; [2006] NTSC 4; BC200600022, in which
the plaintiff participated in training activities on an adventure sail training ship, the Leeuwin,
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uniform way. Further, specific defences adopted in some jurisdictions, such as
those dealing with ’obvious risks’ and dangerous recreational activities, can
also only operate via s 275. Here, the lack of uniformity is most pronounced.
For example, if a consumer is injured while engaged in dangerous recreational
activities, the supplier of such services can potentially defend such a claim in
New South Wales on that basis, even where such a supplier was negligent,
whereas in Victoria it cannot.
Why the legislatures have not considered uniformity to be desirable in the
context of such potentially serious consequences is puzzling. That consumer
protection is sufficiently important to warrant uniformity is understandable;
why consumers of services should be subject to the vagaries of individual state
laws is not clear, though politics and a lack of consensus among governments
may be the underlying cause. Of course, it may be desirable that claims for
carelessly caused injuries are dealt with consistently, irrespective of whether
they are brought in negligence or for breach of s 60. The technicality of
bringing such a claim under ss 60 and 267 should not alter that need for
consistent treatment. But that consistent treatment within states of all claims
for carelessly caused injuries leads to inconsistency and lack of uniformity
between different states. This lack of uniformity is so even if Commonwealth
jurisdiction applies. Ultimately, that lack of uniformity is a result of the failure
of the states to agree on a uniform CLA regime, and that is a regrettable state
of affairs. It is interesting that the new ACL has not circumvented such
inconsistency.
One difficulty with s 275 is its use of the term ’proper law of the contract’.
This is odd terminology, since the CLAs focus on careless conduct, and may
thus be limited in their operation to conduct that occurs within the jurisdiction.
So what happens where a supplier carelessly supplies services to a consumer
in Victoria, but the proper law of the contract is New South Wales? Must the
proper law of the contract be the same as the place in which the services are
supplied? Would the relevantly applicable CLA be that of New South Wales
(according to s 275, yes), but is this possible since the CLA (NSW) is unlikely
to have extra-territorial operation?~8 These questions may well need to be
addressed in more complex cases that could arise.:z9
One further issue in relation to the lack of uniformity arises in relation to
owned by the defendant. She suffered injury when she fell off the main mast. It was held that
the owner of the ship had entered a contract for the supply of services and that this therefore
included an implied term that the services were to be provided with due care and skill. The
defendant had failed to do so, in not having a system in place to ensure that the plaintiff’s
belt was properly secured. Importantly, the exclusion clause contained in the contract was
held to be void under s 68 of the TPA and thus the defendant could not rely on it. Hence, the
defendant was held liable. Further, no contributory negligence defence was considered to be
available in the circumstances either, though the reason for this was not clearly explained.
28 This is so because of the conclusion reached in Insight Vacations Pty Ltd v Young (2011) 243
CLR 149; 276 ALR 497; [2011] HCA 16; BC201102833 at [35] that sections of the CLA
(NSW) that preclude liability in relation to recreational services only apply to the supply of
services in New South Wales, regardless of where the contract for that supply was made ’and
by whatever law it is governed’.
29 One possible solution to this problem is that the various CLAs could be amended to include
extra-territoriality provisions such as to apply the Acts to services supplied under contracts
of which the state is the proper law, irrespective of where the services were performed (my
thanks to the anonymous referee for this suggestion). This could create further problems,
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the exclusion of liability for failure to comply with the statutory guarantees.
Are state laws that allow for the exclusion of liability for breaches of
statutory guarantees still capable of operation ?3o
The statutory guarantees cannot generally31 be excluded as a result of s 64
of the ACL:
Guarantees not to be excluded etc by contract
(1) A term of a contract (including a term that is not set out in the contract but
is incorporated in the contract by another term of the contract) is void to the
extent that the term purports to exclude, restrict or modify, or has the effect
of excluding, restricting or modifying:
(a) the application of all or any of the provisions of this Division; or
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision; or
(c) any liability of a person for a failure to comply with a guarantee that
applies under this Division to a supply of goods or services.
(2) A term of a contract is not taken, for the purposes of this section, to exclude,
restrict or modify the application of a provision of this Division unless the
term does so expressly or is inconsistent with the provision.
Critically, however, it is possible under the CCA to exclude the guarantees in
relation to services in one context, namely, recreational services. In December
2002 s 68B was inserted into the TPA. This earlier provision allowing for the
exclusion of liability has now been replaced by s 139A of the CCA, which is
to the same effect. The stated purpose of s 68B of the TPA was to ’permit
self-assumption of risk by individuals who choose to participate in inherently
risky activities, and [to] allow them to waive their fights under the’ TPA.32 The
section allowed for the exclusion of the implied term of ’due care’ where
’recreational services’ were provided.
Section 139A allows for the exclusion of the statutory guarantees in relation
to services contained in the ACL, in particular, ss 60 and 61. Such a term is
not void under s 64 of the ACL to the extent that it ’excludes, restricts or
modifies’ such a statutory guarantee (s 139A(1)), so long as such exclusion is
limited to liability for death or physical or mental injury. Injury includes the
acceleration or aggravation of injury or a disease (subs (3)). The definition of
recreational services is as follows:
(2) Recreational services are services that consist of participation in:
(a) a sporting activity or a similar leisure time pursuit; or
however, since it could mean that two CLAs both apply to the same services, ie, that of the
state in which the services were supplied and that of the state in which the services were
performed.
30 I have previously discussed the issue of recreational services specifically in J Dietrich,
’Liability for Personal Injuries from Recreational Services and the New Australian
Consumer Law: Uniformity and simplification, or still a mess’ (2011) 19 TLJ 55. Although
I erroneously stated in that article that the relevant remedies section for breach of s 60 of the
ACL was s 236 of the ACL, rather than s 267 of the ACL, and made some other errors
consequential on this mistake, the broad arguments made in that article are still valid.
31 Note, however, s 64A(2) of the ACL which allows some limitation of liability for contracts
of service other than for personal, domestic or household use.
32 Explanatory Memorandum provided with the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for
Recreational Services) Bill 2002. For a more detailed consideration of the background to the
legislative changes, see A Haly, ’The Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational
Services) Act 2002: Complete solution or deficient response?’ (2003) 11 CCLJ 1.
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(b) any other activity that:
(i) involves a significant degree of physical exertion or physical
risk; and
(H) is undertaken for the purposes of recreation, enjoyment or
leisure.
Importantly, subs (4) does not allow for the exclusion of liability for reckless
conduct, defined in subs (5). One complication that arises from s 139A is this:
any state law that seeks to allow for exclusion of liability in wider terms would
be invalid after the decision of Insight, assuming, of course, that the same
conclusion that the High Court reached in relation to s 74(2A) applies equally
to s 275. There is no reason that it should not. At present, however, only
Victoria has legislated to allow for the exclusion of liability for
non-compliance with the statutory guarantees. Although the provisions are in
similar terms as the CCA, they are more onerous in setting out how a supplier
can exclude liability, that is, they are narrower than s 139A. Specifically, such
an exclusion must be in the prescribed form set out in the Schedules to the Fair
Trading (Recreational Services) Regulations 2004 and must have been
brought to the attention of the consumer (s 32N(2) of the FTA (Vic)). What if
a defendant corporation seeks to exclude its liability for negligence for
recreational services provided to a consumer in Victoria, but has not complied
with these presumed requirements? (There is no issue of inconsistency with
Commonwealth laws if Federal jurisdiction is not activated, that is, if the
supplier is not a corporation.) Section 139A of the CCA would allow the
defendant to exclude such liability but the Victorian legislation, which also
governs, would not. Is there an inconsistency between the two provisions such
that s 139A will prevail, or does s 275 of the ACL pick up the Victorian
legislation? Insight does not necessarily deal with this because it deals with
the indirect exclusion of liability in broader circumstances. Thus, in light of
the High Court’s decision, it is not clear whether the Victorian provisions are
inconsistent with s 139A.33
Interestingly, the narrowly stated purpose of s 275 of the ACL was to give
effect to state
laws that allow providers of recreational services to exclude or limit their liabilities
in respect of implied conditions and warranties in consumer contracts [and it was]
expected that the States and Territories that currently have such laws in place will
choose to have similar laws that exclude liability in respect of consumer
guarantees.34
This has not occurred outside of Victoria. Neither the CLA (NSW) (s 5N) nor
the CLA (WA) (s 5J) has as yet been amended to change its exclusion
provisions, which are still drafted in terms of the exclusion of liability for
breach of implied contractual terms. Until such time as they are amended, the
33 Section 139A of the CCA allows for the contractual exclusion of liability and thus reinstates
the common law contract principles (namely, freedom of contract) that are otherwise
disallowed by s 64 of the ACL. Arguably, then, the Victorian legislation only places a limit
on the common law fight generally to exclude liability. Once the s 139A threshold has been
met, it could be argued that it is not inconsistent with s 139A to place further requirements
to the exclusion of liability. Obviously, however, the issue remains an open one.
34 See Explanatory Memorandum to Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law)
Bill (No 2) 2010 at [7.136], p 208.
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issue of inconsistency will not arise. However, if they should be amended in
the spirit of the current, redundant, NSW provision, then problems may arise.
Section 5N allows for the exclusion of liability for recklessness, whereas
s 139A of the CCA does not. If s 5N were amended to apply to breaches of
statutory guarantees, then any consumer who is injured by recklessness, for
which liability has been sought to be excluded by contract and justified by
s 5N, could argue that that section is inconsistent with s 139A of the CCA’s
more limited operation (not extending to recklessness). It should therefore be
rendered void by s 64 of the ACL. In other words, should the NSW and WA
legislatures seek to re-instate exclusion provisions that are in different terms
to those of s 139A of the CCA, then the potential for inconsistency again
arises and the reasoning of Insight, if applicable to s 275 of the ACL, would
invalidate such attempts so far as they apply to corporations.
One final point is worth noting. When we move away from the guarantee
of due care and skill and consider other statutory guarantees in relation to
services, the legal position changes and the ACL does operate uniformly. The
position under s 60 can be contrasted with the operation of s 61.
Fitness for purpose: s 61
A further statutory guarantee, though perhaps of ]ess likely relevance to
contracts for the supply of services, is the guarantee that services are fit for
their purpose.
61
(l) m
Guarantees as to fitness for a particular purpose etc
(a) a person (the supplier) supplies, in trade or commerce, services to a
consumer; and
(b) the consumer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
supplier any particular purpose for which the services are being
acquired by the consumer;
there is a guarantee that the services, and any product resulting from the
services, will be reasonably fit for that purpose...
Subsection (2) is similar in effect as subs (1) but in relation to consumers
making known ’the result that the consumer wishes the services to achieve’.
The guarantee does not apply if the consumer did not rely, or it was
unreasonable for the consumer to rely, on the skill and judgement of the
supplier.
A breach of the guarantee that services are fit for their purpose (if a
particular purpose is made known) would not usually be based on a finding of
carelessness, but instead on a failure of the services to fulfil that purpose, even
in the absence of any carelessness. In those circumstances, a statutory claim
under the ACL has an advantage in that there is no need for a consumer to
prove a lack of care. Instead, a failure to comply imposes strict liability,
irrespective of fault.35 In such a case, the CLA provisions dealing with liability
35 Cf Crawford v Mayne Nickless Ltd (t/as MSS Alarm Service) (1992) 59 SASR 490, a claim
for breach of s 74(2) of the TPA (the previous fitness for purpose implied term), in which
there was no discussion of whether the supplier had acted with due care in the court’s
determination of the question of breach.
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and defences would not apply, even if the claim is for personal injury.36 It is
difficult, however, to think of realistic examples of how unfitness for purpose
can lead to physical injury. One might be where a consumer seeking exercises
to alleviate back pain is given exercises that in fact lead to back injury. In such
a case, it would not matter whether the prescription of the exercise was
carelessly made or not.
The stated goal of uniformity of Australia’s consumer protection laws has not
been achieved in relation to all matters covered by the ACL. In particular, the
consequences of a breach of s 60 of the ACL are governed by individual state
and territory laws found in each jurisdiction’s CLA and these set out different
legal regimes for determining liability for careless conduct (including
statutory claims based on proof of negligence) and set out different applicable
defences. As long as the various CLAs are not uniform, the hope for a
simplified and uniform regime of liability has not been achieved, at least so far
as claims for consequential losses are concerned. Obviously, the best solution
to this problem :would be for the states and territories to reach agreement on
a uniform civil liability regime, as was the intention of the authors of the Ipp
Report, on which the civil liability legislation was largely based, from the
outset.37 But the likelihood of this occurring in the medium-term future
appears remote given that the ACL process has not resulted uniform solutions.
36 One question is whether limitations and caps on personal injury damages under the CLAs
still apply to injuries not caused by carelessness. These are not identical from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Presumably, since these still form limits on claims for personal injury (even if
not carelessly caused injury: see, eg, s 50 of the CLA (Qld)), then s 275 of the ACL would
give effect to those limitations.
37 Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report, October 2002. The Report can be accessed
at: <//revofneg.treasury.gov.au>. See in particular Recommendation 1, pp I and 26.
